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THREE EXISTENTIALIST READINGS OF GLORIA 
ANZALDÚA’S  BORDERLANDS/LA FRONTERA 
 
MARIANA ALESSANDRI 
The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley 
 
I will not be shamed again 
Nor will I shame myself  
–Gloria Anzaldúa1 
 
Abstract: This essay provides three new and related philosophical 
readings  of  Gloria  Anzaldúa’s  Borderlands/la Frontera: 1) in the lineage 
of canonical European Existentialists like Jean Paul Sartre, who provides 
an analysis of shame; 2) in the lineage of Mexican Existentialists like 
Samuel Ramos and Octavio Paz, who attribute a relative of shame to 
Mexicans; and 3) in dialogue with Africana Existentialists like Franz 
Fanon, who describe the bodily shame of nonwhites in racist societies. 
Anzaldúa’s   concept   of   “linguistic   terrorism,”   which   existentially  
translates into la vergüenza linguística, extends the scope of European, 
Africana, and Mexican Existentialisms while putting all three in dialogue 
for the first time, and serves as a first attempt at formulating a Chicana 
Existentialism. 
Keywords: Gloria Anzaldúa, Phenomenology, Existentialism, Africana 
Existentialism. 
 
 María Lugones, Mariana Ortega, Linda Martín Alcoff, 
Andrea Pitts, Cynthia Paccacerqua, and Alexander Stehn are 
among the academic philosophers who read Gloria Anzaldúa as a 
philosopher. Ortega, along with Communications scholar 
Jacqueline M. Martinez reads Anzaldúa through the lens of 
Phenomenology, comparing her ideas and methods to those of 
Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger (Ortega 2016; Martinez 
2000, 2013). I suggest that we pivot, however, and put Anzaldúa 
in conversation with European Existential figures like Søren 
Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Jean-Paul Sartre. She 
explicitly located herself in this lineage by recounting her early 
philosophical acquaintance with Nietzsche and Kierkegaard in 
elementary   school,   calling   herself   “that   kind   of   kid”   (Reuman 
                                                     
1 Anzaldúa places this couplet in Chapter 7 of Borderlands/La Frontera, in the 
section  entitled  “El  Día  de  la  Chicana.” 
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31).2 But we would miss something if we did not also see 
Anzaldúa’s   work   as   growing   out   of   the  Mexican   Existentialist  
tradition. It is clear from her reference in Borderlands to La raza 
cósmica (1925) that Anzaldúa read Jose Vasconcelos, which 
means she likely read Samuel Ramos and Octavio Paz, both of 
whom asked what it meant to be Mexican. Their answers likely 
informed her own view of what it means to be Mexican-American 
living along the US-Mexico border. The shame and perhaps 
inferiority she felt existing in-between cultures resonates with 
their account of Mexicans, who suffer from the history of conquest 
and colonization. Finally, there is much insight to be gained from 
reading Anzaldúa alongside Africana Existentialists like James 
Baldwin, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Franz Fanon, who write about the 
inescapability of blackness.3 Like these authors, Anzaldúa 
describes existing in a nonwhite body in a particular time in 
history within a given set of economic constraints and oppressive 
political circumstances. 
This is not a historical essay but a philosophical one. It 
develops three readings of Anzaldúa as Existentialist philosopher 
and as intellectual bridgebuilder connecting European, Mexican, 
and Africana philosophies. Scholars know that Kierkegaard, 
Nietzsche, and Vasconcelos directly influenced Anzaldúa, but the 
degree to which other European, Africana, and Mexican 
                                                     
2 Søren  Kierkegaard  was  Anzaldúa’s  first  philosophical  love.  She  claims  to  have  
read him early, and he affected her profoundly. An explicit reference to 
Kierkegaard survived late drafts of Borderlands/La Frontera before she excised 
it. Anzaldúa claims to have been moved by his Sickness unto Death, from which 
she reworked the Kierkegaardian concepts of despair and sin. In Kierkegaard, 
Anzaldúa   claims   to   have   found   someone  whose   despair   “equaled   [her]   own”  
(Reader 235). On the basis of Kierkegaard alone, it would be appropriate to read 
Anzaldúa an Existentialist. Like him, she was invested in the project of 
describing how it is to exist, especially in a brown body and with a misfit tongue. 
See Alessandri, forthcoming in El Mundo Zurdo and in Taking Kierkegaard 
Personally. 
3 Including the European tradition, designation of this branch of philosophy is 
complicated. Albert Camus famously did not want to called an Existentialist, 
though   Sartre   did.   Kierkegaard   is   sometimes   called   a   “forerunner”   or   even  
“father”   of   Existentialism.   Lewis   Gordon   uses   the   term   “Black”   more   than  
“Africana,”   when   referring   to   this   field   of   study,   which   he   alternately   calls  
“existential  philosophy”  or  “philosophy  of  existence.”  He  makes  clear  that  not  
all Africana philosophy is existentialist (Gordon 4). 
 
 119 
 
Existentialists influenced her has not been adequately examined. 
Instead of locating these historical connections, I focus on one 
theme that spans all three Existentialisms: shame. I contend that 
Anzaldúa’s  description  of  shame  challenges  Sartre’s,  much   like  
Franz Fanon did, but from a Chicana perspective. Her theory of 
“linguistic   terrorism”   and   my   formulation   of   its   existential  
manifestation—la vergüenza linguística—connects the three 
branches of Existentialism by highlighting a condition shared by 
many Hispanics raised in the United States. This essay is written 
in five parts. In part one, I offer initial reasons to read Anzaldúa 
as an Existentialist and not just a Phenomenologist. In the second 
section,   I   lay  out  Sartre’s  description  of   shame   from  Being and 
Nothingness (L’Être   et   le   néant:   Essai   d'ontologie  
phénoménologique, 1943), which is considered the classic 
Existentialist account of shame. In part three, I review  Fanon’s  
critique of Sartre and highlight one striking affinity between 
Anzaldúa and Africana Existentialism. Part four shows how 
Anzaldúa’s   account   of   shame   is   continuous   with   the   Mexican  
Existentialist fixation on inferiority. Finally, part five uses 
Anzaldúa’s  concept  of  “linguistic  terrorism”  to  showcase  one  of  
the ways that Chicana Existentialism can make a unique 
contribution to philosophy by examining the connections between 
language, identity, and shame. 
 
Part I: Anzaldúa as Existentialist 
 
My reading of Anzaldúa as an Existentialist faces two 
related obstacles: 1) when read as a philosopher, Anzaldúa usually 
gets read as a Phenomenologist rather than as an Existentialist; 2) 
the field of Chicana Existentialism does not officially exist yet.  
In Phenomenology of Chicana Experience and Identity 
(2000), Jacqueline Martinez argues that Anzaldúa and other 
Chicanas used a phenomenological method remarkably similar to 
Husserl’s,  to  “focus  our  attention  on  the  life  world  and  the  lived  
experience of persons   […]   because   it   recognizes   the   inherent  
interrelatedness of human conscious experience and the fact of our 
locatedness   in   time,   place,   history,   and   culture”   (ix).  Martinez  
claims  that  Chicana  phenomenologists  first  “stop  the  natural  flow  
of our conscious awareness,”   then   “look   at   it   from   different  
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angles,”  and  finally  “understand  the  social  structures  that  allowed  
that  thing  to  show  up  as  such  to  begin  with”  (x).4  
Like Martinez, Mariana Ortega reads Anzaldúa through 
Phenomenology, specifically tying her to Martin Heidegger. In In-
Between (2016),   Ortega   invokes   Heidegger’s   concepts   of  
“Dasein”   and   “being-in-the-world”   to   support   the   thesis   that  
Anzaldúa’s   narrative   and   poetic   “I”   is   more   existential   than  
ontological.5 Despite the conceptual resonances of my reading 
with  Ortega’s,  I  believe  there  is  just  as  much,  if  not  more,  to  be  
gained from reading Anzaldúa alongside European, Mexican, and 
Africana Existentialists. 
A book titled Chicana Existentialisms does not yet exist, 
but before 1997, Existence in Black did not either. Thanks to 
Lewis Gordon, Africana Existentialism is a recognizable and well-
respected field of inquiry. Black philosophers in and out of the 
United States ask timely questions about what it means to occupy 
black bodies in White Supremacist societies. Gordon describes the 
field  of  Africana  Existentialism  as  “a  philosophical  practice  that  
is premised upon concerns of freedom, anguish, responsibility, 
embodied  agency,  sociality,  and  liberation”  (3).  Franz  Fanon  is  an  
Africana Existentialist insofar  as,  Tendayi  Sithole  observes,  “[his]  
concern  is  the  existential  condition  of  the  black  subject”  (178).  In  
a similar way, we can begin to develop a Chicana Existentialism 
with Anzaldúa at the helm. 
Like Gordon, Carlos Sánchez recovered a piece of the 
Mexican Existentialist tradition, specifically as it thrived between 
1948-1952. Contingency and Commitment (2016) tells the story 
of el Grupo Hiperión, which included Emilio Uranga, Jorge 
Portilla, Joaquín Sánchez MacGregor, Luis Villoro, and Ricardo 
Guerra. Sánchez reads these philosophers as beginning not with 
universal principles, but with local, embodied experiences of 
being Mexican within certain econo-political situations. He argues 
                                                     
4 In 2013, Martinez put Anzaldúa in conversation with Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
(who sometimes gets classified as an Existentialist, but not in this case) claiming 
that both authors focus on the importance of culture and communication. 
Martinez   reads   Anzaldúa’s   concepts   of   “borderlands,”   “consciencia   de   la  
mestiza,”  and  “la  facultad”  as  primarily  phenomenological  interventions  (226). 
5 For  a  reading  of  Ortega’s  “Existential  I”  in  dialogue  with  Anzaldúa,  see  Newton  
and Sinclair. 
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that using their existential condition as a point of departure often 
landed these thinkers on as universal a theory as Existential 
philosophy can ever hope for (87-8). Like Gordon, Sánchez left 
behind a narrative thread of Mexican Existentialist thought for 
scholars to pick up and continue developing. 
The idea of a Chicano Existentialism is not new, but it is 
anemic and phallocentric. Three years before Anzaldúa and 
Cherríe Moraga published This Bridge Called My Back (1981), 
San Jose State Professor of Mexican American Studies Elihu 
Carranza published Chicanismo: Philosophical Fragments. It is a 
description of being Chicano in the United States, of enduring the 
process of erosion and assimilation. Carranza describes a 
hyphenated existence similar to the one that Anzaldúa describes 
in Borderlands/La Frontera. The hyphen between Mexican and 
American is a defining one for many Chicanxs, one that they fall 
into, feeling rejected by both cultures. In 1984, Jessie Contreras, 
Doctoral Student at Berkeley, wrote a dissertation under 
prominent  Heidegger  scholar  Hubert  Dreyfus,  titled  “Existential  
Phenomenology and its Influence on Mexican and Chicano 
Philosophy   and   Philosophy   of   Education.”   Contreras   tied   the  
history of Chicano Studies programs in the US to Mexican 
Existentialist thought, specifically as it was formulated by the 
association of Mexican scholars and artists Ateneo de Juventud at 
the beginning of the 20th Century and the Grupo Hiperión in the 
1940s and 50s. The dissertation is a genealogy of Chicano male 
thought read through the lens of Existentialism.6 It is in light of 
these (exclusively male) histories that we can develop a Chicana 
Existentialism as surely as Gordon and Sánchez did with Africana 
and Mexican Existentialisms.  
Because of her subject position, in this essay I read 
Anzaldúa as having more in common with Fanon and Paz than 
Husserl   or  Heidegger.   I  will   show   that,   like  Fanon,  Anzaldúa’s  
philosophical concern is the existential condition of the colonial 
subject, and her ideas provoke questions about freedom, anguish, 
                                                     
6 Contreras seems to have been woefully ignorant of women of color feminists. 
He makes no reference to This Bridge Called my Back, which was published by 
Persephone Press in 1981, presumably while he was researching his dissertation 
on Chicano Studies. He also fails to account for Chicana authors in his 
intellectual history, which ranges from 19th Century Mexico to 1983 in 
California. 
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responsibility, embodied agency, sociality and liberation. 
Borderlands/La Frontera draws attention to the concrete lived 
experience of the Chicana subject, and her descriptions reveal a 
concern for the liberation of embodied Chicanas. Anzaldúa 
scholars   have   shown   that   her   account   of   “linguistic   terrorism”  
teaches us something new about the existential reality of Mexican-
Americans in Deep South Texas, but no one yet has read it as a 
critique of Sartrean shame.  
 
Part II: Sartre on Shame 
 
By the time Anzaldúa found Kierkegaard, Sartre had 
already written his famous phenomenology of shame in Being and 
Nothingness.  It  is  no  surprise  that  the  man  who  wrote  “hell  is  other  
people”  also  believed   that  “the  other is the hidden death of my 
possibilities”  (“No  Exit”;;  Being 354).  Sartre’s  “other”  limits  me  
when  he  sees  me.  If  I’m  lucky,  Sartre  says,  the  other  sees  me  as  a  
“fascinating   object,”   but   since   I’m   not   in   control,   Sartre   calls  
being  seen  a  “danger”  (484). I need the other to reflect me back to 
myself, but I do not know which me he will reflect (349). In seeing 
me, the other shows me to myself, and in so doing, he might shame 
me.   Sartre   writes:   “I   discover   [myself]   in   shame   and,   in   other  
instances, in pride. It is shame or pride which reveals to me the 
Other’s  look  and  myself  at  the  end  of  that  look”  (350).  According  
to Sartre, shame happens when I do not like what I see in the 
mirror; pride happens when I do. Insofar as the other defines me, 
Sartre says that   I  am  not  my  own.  He  explains:  “Shame  […]  is  
shame of self; it is the recognition of the fact that I am indeed that 
object which the Other is looking at and judging. I can be ashamed 
only as my freedom escapes me in order to become a given object 
[…]  I  am this  self  which  another  knows”  (350). 
Sartre uncritically takes for granted that the mirror is 
accurate. To illustrate this, he tells a story of a man standing in an 
empty hallway bent over a keyhole of an apartment. If no one sees 
what he is doing, Sartre says, the man gets lost in his spying and 
forgets himself. But as soon as he hears footsteps in the hallway, 
he has the sensation of being caught. When he becomes aware of 
someone watching him staring into the keyhole, he becomes a 
Peeping-Tom.   For   Sartre,   the   other’s   testimony   is   always  
accurate:  “I  am  this  being.  I  do  not  for  an  instant  think  of  denying  
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it;;  my  shame  is  a  confession”  (351).  Shame  is  admitting  that  I  am  
what you see, for Sartre, it is admitting that I am guilty.  
Like  Sartre,  Anzaldúa  imagines  shame  like  a  mirror:  “to  
be close to another Chicana is like looking into the mirror. We are 
afraid  of  what  we’ll  see   there”  (Borderlands 80). For Anzaldúa 
and Sartre, shame comes from being looked at, and in all cases, it 
is   not   exactly   the   other’s   eyes   that   shame   me,   but   my   seeing  
myself as the other sees me. Whether I am looking through a 
peephole, as Sartre imagines, or about to open my mouth in the 
presence of another Latina, as Anzaldúa describes, I become a 
thing,  an  object  for  the  other,  and  potentially  “the  subject  of  your  
burla”  (80). 
In Chapter 1 of Borderlands/La Frontera, Anzaldúa tells 
the story of how her cousin Pedro ran from the migra but got 
caught and was deported to Guadalajara despite being a fifth-
generation  US  citizen.  She  notes  that  “he  tried  to  smile  when  he  
looked back at us, to raise his fist. But I saw the shame pushing 
his head down, I saw the terrible weight of shame hunch his 
shoulders”  (26,  my  italics).  Anzaldúa  admits  to  feeling  this  shame  
when  Chicanas  like  her  get  rejected  by  the  greater  society:  “Yes,  
all you people wound us when you reject us. Rejection strips us of 
self-worth; our vulnerability exposes us to shame. It is our innate 
identity you find wanting. We are ashamed that we need your 
good   opinion,   that   we   need   your   acceptance”   (110).   On  
Anzaldúa’s   reading, Chicanas experience the shame of needing 
the  other’s  approval,  of  placing  their  self-worth in the hands of the 
other. 
Although   Anzaldúa’s   use   of   shame   thus   far   could   be  
considered Sartrean, what makes her analysis of shame more 
descriptive of Chicana experience in particular is her emphasis on 
the role of language in Chicana shame. In 1952, Africana 
Existentialist Franz Fanon began the project of improving upon 
Sartre’s   description   of   shame   by   incorporating   the   linguistic  
element, which Anzaldúa continued in 1986. I now turn to a 
discussion  of  Fanon’s  linguistic  contribution  to  the  philosophy  of  
shame   followed   by   a   discussion   of   Anzaldúa’s   concept   of  
“linguistic  terrorism.” 
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Part III: Fanon on Shame 
 
Franz Fanon wrote about language shame, which 
connects him directly to Anzaldúa, but he also wrote about shame 
in general. In Black Skin, White Masks (Peau noire, masques 
blancs, 1952),  he  challenged  Sartre’s  conclusion  that  shame  is  a  
confession, countering it with the idea that for a Black man in a 
White  Supremacist  society,  the  (White)  other  does  not  “discover”  
him as a criminal, for example, but rather turns him into one. For 
a Black man, says Fanon, shame is not a confession, not an 
admission  of  guilt.  A  Black  man’s  shame  is  generated  by  the  kind  
of seeing that happens in White supremacy. For a White man to 
feel shame, perhaps Sartre is right that he would have to be guilty. 
In contrast, Fanon says that a Black man just has to be seen to be 
shamed, which makes shame an admission of impotence, not guilt. 
The shamed party cowers in both cases, however, which only 
reinforces the judgment of guilt. Fanon recalls being called out as 
a  “Negro”  on  a  train,  and,  after  having  initially  been  amused  by  it,  
felt trapped by that image:  
 
I could no longer laugh, because I already knew that 
 there were legends, stories, history, and above all 
 historicity,  which  I  had  learned  about  from  Jaspers.  […] 
 In the train it was no longer a question of being aware of 
 my body in the third person but in a triple person. In the 
 train I was given not one but two, three places. I had 
 already   stopped   being   amused.   […]   I   as   responsible   at  
 the same time for my body, for my race, for my 
 ancestors. I subjected myself to an objective 
 examination, I discovered my blackness, my ethnic 
 characteristics; and I was battered down by tom-toms, 
 cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetishism, racial 
 defects, slave-ships,   and  above  all  else,  above  all:   “Sho  
 good  eatin.’  (112)7  
                                                     
7 Before Fanon gave us a corrective to Sartre’s  phenomenology  of  shame, W.E.B. 
Du  Bois  gave  us  “double-consciousness.”  In  The Souls of Black Folk, published 
in  1903,  Du  Bois  described   the  “second-sight”   that   the  Black  man  possesses,  
which lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is not 
altogether gift, for Du Bois, since he said that he has no true self-consciousness, 
which,   in  Sartrean   language,  might  amount   to  “he   is  never  his  acts.”  Du  Bois  
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Fanon was caught in shame, but Sartre was wrong about what his 
shame meant. 
The first chapter of Black Skin, White Masks, is titled 
“The  Negro  and  Language.”  Here,  Fanon  asks  why  a  colonized  
Black man from the Antilles would strive to speak French and 
responds  that  to  speak  “means  above  all  to  assume  a  culture,   to  
support   the  weight  of   a   civilization”   (17-18). He draws out the 
racial  dimension  of  linguistic  difference:  “the  negro  of  the  Antilles  
will  be  proportionately  whiter,”  or  “more  of  a  human  being  […]  
in  direct   ratio   to  his  mastery  of   the  French   language.”  He  adds,  
“mastery   of   language   affords   remarkable   power.”   “Every  
colonized   people…   every   people   in   whose   soul   an   inferiority 
complex has been created by the death and burial of its local 
cultural originality—finds itself face to face with the language of 
the civilizing nation; that is, with the culture of the mother 
country”  (18,  my  italics).  A  sure  way  to  colonize  a  people  and  to  
make them feel inferior, for Fanon, is to take away their language. 
This is exactly what happened: 
 
The middle class in the Antilles never speak Creole except 
to their servants. In school the children of Martinique are 
taught to scorn the dialect. One avoids Creolisms. Some 
families completely forbid the use of Creole, and mothers 
ridicule their children from speaking it. (20) 
 
                                                     
described  “always  looking  at  oneself  through  the  eyes  of  others,  of  measuring  
one’s  soul  by  the  tape  of  a  world  that  looks  on  in  amused  contempt  and  pity”  
(45). Like Fanon, Du Bois would not have believed that shame is a confession 
but   rather   a   reaction   to   being   looked   at.   Comparing   Du   Bois’s   “double-
consciousness”   and  Anzaldúa’s   “Mestiza   consciousness,”  Martinez  points  out  
that   Du   Bois   and   Anzaldúa   both   name   a   special   “gift”   that arises from the 
experience of systemic oppression. Du Bois says that black people who suffer 
from double-consciousness  gain  a  kind  of  “second-sight,”  while  Anzaldúa  called  
“la   facultad”   that  power  of   seeing  which  comes  out  of  a   life  of   linguistic  and  
racial  oppression  (Martinez,  “The  Double-Consciousness”  168-9). 
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Fanon shows how the possession of a language gives you access 
to a world and a certain degree of power.8 Naturally, this causes 
families to begin to break down. As Fanon puts it: 
 
[The Negro] is incarnating a new type of man that he 
imposes on his associates and his family. And so his old 
mother can no longer understand him when he talks to her 
about  his  duds,  the  family’s  crummy  joint,  the  dump…all  
of it, of course, tricked out with the appropriate accent. 
(36-7) 
 
The   Black   man’s   response   to   what   Fanon   diagnoses   as   an  
“inferiority  complex”  is  to  blend,  fit  in,  dump  one’s  family,  and  
claw  toward  linguistic  acceptance.  After  all,  he  says,  “to  speak a 
language is to take on a world, a culture. The Antilles Negro who 
wants to be white will be the whiter as he gains mastery of the 
cultural  tool  that  language  is”  (38). 
Whether or not Anzaldúa read Fanon, her theory of 
“linguistic   terrorism”   sounds   remarkably   similar   to   Fanon’s  
description.   Both   contest   Sartre’s   notion   that   shame   is   a  
confession.  Most  importantly,  Anzaldúa’s  analysis  gives  us  a  new  
way to talk about linguistic shame that is not at bottom, indicative 
of guilt. When Fanon wrote about the colonized peoples of the 
Antilles in Black Skin, White Masks in 1952, he claimed to be 
speaking for all colonized peoples, which presumably would have 
included Mexican-Americans in deep South Texas, whom he 
would have judged to be living in a US colony. The story Fanon 
told about Blacks speaking French is remarkably close to 
Anzaldúa’s   observation   that  Mexican-Americans long to speak 
proper English. He understood well the external reasons why the 
Antillean  man  would  want  to  learn  French:  “Yes,  I  must  take  great  
pains with my speech, because I shall be more or less judged by 
it.  With  great  contempt  they  will  say  of  me  ‘he  doesn’t  even  know  
how  to  speak  French’”  (20).  But  Anzaldúa also keyed in on how 
Mexican-Americans   internalize   that  view:   “Chicanas  who  grew  
                                                     
8 Fanon writes: “it  is  understandable  that  the  first  action  of  the  black  man  is  a  
reaction, and, since the Negro is appraised in terms of the extent of his 
assimilation, it is also understandable why the newcomer expresses himself only 
in  French”  (36). 
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up speaking Chicano Spanish have internalized the belief that we 
speak  poor  Spanish”  (Borderlands 80). If Fanon rightly contended 
that  “historically,  it  must  be  understood   that the Negro wants to 
speak French because it is the key that can open doors which were 
still  barred  to  him  fifty  years  ago,”  Anzaldúa  also  added  a  personal  
dimension, recounting that her own mother wanted her to erase 
her Mexican accent (Black Skin 38, Borderlands 76). For 
Anzaldúa and Fanon, language is identity, so the languages one 
chooses to develop as well as the ones one chooses to discard 
reveal the life one wants to lead. Fanon wrote about Antillean men 
who learned English but subversively held onto their local dialect; 
Anzaldúa   herself  majored   in  English   to   “spite,   to   show  up,   the  
arrogant racist teachers who thought all Chicano children were 
dumb  and  dirty”   (“Speaking”  165).   In  other  words,  Anzaldúa’s  
descriptions   are   like   Fanon’s,   but   they   are   descriptive of an 
invisible people who routinely get called Mexicans.  
Before   expanding   upon   the   concept   of   “linguistic  
terrorism”   and   la vergüenza linguística, I turn to a reading of 
Anzaldúa in the lineage of Mexican Existentialists, for whom the 
Mexican suffers from similar feelings of inferiority and shame as 
Fanon’s  colonized  Black  man.   
 
Part IV: Mexican Existentialists on Shame 
 
 In his 1984 dissertation in Chicano Studies from 
Berkeley, Jessie Contreras traced Chicano thought of the 1960s 
back to Mexican ideas. He pointed out that students in the earliest 
Chicano Studies programs were taught Mexican Existentialist 
thinkers like José Vasconcelos, Antonio Caso, Octavio Paz, 
Samuel Ramos, and Leopoldo Zea.9 Although her field was not 
Chicano Studies, Anzaldúa’s  timing  makes  it  likely  that  she,  too,  
would have studied these thinkers (188, 198). Anzaldúa was a 
meticulous writer who kept her references to other thinkers to a 
                                                     
9 Contreras writes:  “Ramos  and  Paz  are  important  to  Chicanos  in  that  they  argued  
that the philosopher who molded culture to fit national circumstances, rather than 
the one immersed in European and Anglo-American ideas, ought to acquire 
national eminence. For these reasons, Ramos’  Profile of Man and Culture in 
Mexico and  Paz’s  The Labyrinth of Solitude became important works in many 
course  reading  lists  of  Chicano  Studies  programs”  (209-10). 
 128 
 
minimum.10 In light of this, her quoting Vasconcelos in 
Borderlands is significant.11 
Vasconcelos was mentor to Samuel Ramos, student of 
Antonio Caso and reader of the Spanish philosopher José Ortega 
y Gasset. In Profile of Man and Culture in Mexico (1934), Ramos 
diagnosed Mexicans with a close cousin of shame: inferiority 
(Contreras 94-105). If Contreras is right that Chicanos learned the 
history of Mexican intellectual thought, Anzaldúa would have 
read Ramos and Paz along with Vasconcelos, and so would have 
been   familiar  with  Ramos’   “pelado,”   the  caricature  of   the  poor  
and illiterate, yet rude Mexican, who seems to have morphed into 
Paz’s   “pachuco,”   the   introverted   and   troubled   Mexican   who  
disguises himself in a coded language and dress.12 Anzaldúa may 
even   have   been   familiar   with   Emilio   Uranga’s   concept   of  
“Zozobra,”   which   is   the   particularly Mexican condition of 
unsettledness—perhaps   the   Mexican   correlate   to   Sartre’s  
“nausea”—in which one swings from identification with the 
European Conquistador to identification with the Indigenous 
Mexican, leaving behind an emotional wake of what Carlos 
Sánchez  names  “insufficiency,  groundlessness,  and  loss.”13  
These Mexican Existentialists focus on the negative traits 
of the Mexican as a product of violent colonialism and repeated 
degradation.   Anzaldúa’s   “New   Mestiza”   shares   some   of   these  
traits, like patience and humility, but she reverses course and 
focuses on the pride and stubbornness of the Chicana: 
 
Los Chicanos, how patient we seem, how very patient. 
 There is the quiet of the Indian about us. We know how 
 to survive. When other races have given up their tongue, 
 we’ve   kept   ours   […]   Humildes yet proud, quietos yet 
                                                     
10 This may have been why, at the eleventh hour, Anzaldúa pulled Kierkegaard 
from Borderlands/La Frontera.  See  Alessandri,  “Leave  out  ‘Kierquegard.’” 
11 For more comparative scholarship between Anzaldúa and Mexican thinkers, 
see Sánchez Prado and García. 
12 We might add here Emilio Uranga, whose description of the Mexican as 
suffering from zozobra,  or  an  uneasiness,  is  an  advancement  of  Ramos’s  Peludo 
and  Paz’s  Pachuco. 
13 See  Carlos  Sánchez,  “(M)Existentialism.”  In  Contingency and Commitment, 
Sánchez reads the philosophy of Grupo Hiperión in precisely this way, as 
swinging from one extreme to the other, as itself infected with zozobra. 
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 wild, nosotros los mexicanos will walk by the crumbling 
 askes as we go about our business. Stubborn, 
 persevering, impenetrable as stone, yet possessing a 
 malleability that renders us unbreakable, we the mestizas 
 and mestizos, will remain. (Borderlands 85-6) 
 
Anzaldúa’s  language  is  more  inclusive  than  Paz’s  and  Ramos’s,  
and her description of nosotros los mexicanos more hopeful. But 
she also notes that before recognizing and adopting the Mestiza 
consciousness, Mexican-Americans are subject to the kinds of 
shame and humiliation that Paz and Ramos may have had in mind. 
Anzaldúa did not diagnose Chicano/as in the US with inferiority, 
but she did talk about their shame. Nowhere does this shame cut 
so  deeply,  in  Anzaldúa’s  writing,  as  in  her  discussion  of  linguistic  
terrorism. 
 
Part V: Anzaldúa on Shame and Pride 
 
 “How   to   Tame   a   Wild   Tongue,”   Chapter   V   in  
Borderlands/La Frontera, is among the most taught, studied, and 
cited sections of the book. Here, Anzaldúa offers a description of 
the experience of being language-shamed. The chapter begins 
with a dentist telling Anzaldúa that her tongue is getting in the 
way of his success (75). She interprets him literally and 
metaphorically, pointing out that unbridled tongues everywhere 
have   stood   in   power’s   way,   only   to   be   terrorized   by   it.   On  
Anzaldúa’s  account,  her  tongue’s  refusal  to  speak  only  English  or  
Spanish presented a threat to people in power who believed in 
language purity. Her teachers hit her for speaking Spanish and her 
mother pleaded with her to lose her Spanish accent when speaking 
English (75-6). She writes about the speech class she was required 
to take at Pan-American College, mandatory for students with 
Mexican-sounding last names (Borderlands 54; Johnson and Cole 
29). Researchers have confirmed not only that Speech 113x was 
mandatory for Mexicans, but also that it met five days a week over 
two semesters and was required for graduation (Johnson and 
Cole).  
 In addition to fulfilling the traditional course 
requirements, Anzaldúa claims that academic success for the 
Chicana   involved   learning   to   obey   the   “reglas   de   academia,”  
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which are implicit linguistic and behavioral rules. In a public 
lecture  at  Anzaldúa’s  undergraduate  Alma  Mater  I  have imagined 
these to include: 
 
1. Arrive on time. 
2. Spell correctly. 
3. Address superiors in a professional way (Doctor, 
Professor  are  both  ok;;  “Miss”  is  not). 
4. Don’t  split  your  infinitives. 
5. Don’t just send an attachment as an email. You 
must write things in the body of the email too.  
6. Learn how to use commas, semicolons, periods, 
and paragraphs.  
7. If you want a recommendation, go see your 
professor  during  office  hours  to  ask  them;;  don’t 
do it by email. 
8. Turn assignments in on time. 
9. Don’t  ask  for  extensions.  Teachers  will  think  you  
are lying. 
10. Don’t   say   “my   car   broke   down,”   or   “my  
Grandmother   died.”   Teachers   will   call   these  
“excuses,”  and  say  that  they  have  heard  them  all.  
(Alessandri 2017) 
 
Some of these rules are what academics think of as 
common-sense, but to a first-generation college student, or first-
generation in the US, perhaps not. In this context, these rules 
reveal a culture of suspicion that borders on racism. Linguistic 
reglas, in particular, preoccupy Anzaldúa in Borderlands, and she 
spends the rest of the chapter defending Chicano Spanish.  
In justifying her language, Anzaldúa was also justifying 
the existence of the Mexican-American of Deep South Texas, as 
Fanon did with the colonized  Black  man.  “Ethnic  identity  is  twin  
skin   to   linguistic   identity”   is  Anzaldúa’s   equivalent   to   Fanon’s  
claim   that   to   speak   “means   above   all   to   assume   a   culture,   to  
support  the  weight  of  a  civilization”  (Borderlands 81; Black Skin 
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17-18).14 La vergüenza linguística is the effect of linguistic 
terrorism on hundreds of thousands of people in the Rio Grande 
Valley and Latinx all over the country. In Borderlands/La 
Frontera Anzaldua writes: 
 
Pena. Shame. Low estimation of self. In childhood we 
 are told that our language is wrong. Repeated attacks on 
 our native tongue diminish our sense of self. The attacks 
 continue throughout our lives. Chicanas feel 
 uncomfortable talking in Spanish to Latinas, afraid of 
 their censure. Their language was not outlawed in their 
 countries. They had a whole lifetime of being immersed 
 in their native tongue; generations, centuries in which 
 Spanish was a first language, taught in school, heard of 
 radio and TV, and read in the newspaper. (80) 
 
In this passage, Anzaldúa is referring to speaking Spanish among 
Chicanas and Latinas, who, in her experience, fight for top spot 
among minorities.15 The Chicana who speaks no Spanish would 
not want the Chicana who speaks Spanish fluently to see her, 
because it would provoke her shame. 
 Anzaldúa worked to convert her linguistic shame into 
pride,  taking  solace  in  poetry:  “when  I  saw  poetry  written  in  Tex-
Mex for the first time, a feeling of pure joy flashed through me. I 
felt  like  we  really  existed  as  a  people”  (82).  For  Anzaldúa,  as  for 
Sartre, pride means being seen in the light that I choose. But unlike 
Sartre, Anzaldúa ties pride to legitimacy and freedom, both of 
which come from the legitimacy of her language. Pride, for 
Anzaldúa, consists of seeing herself represented in language, 
untranslated. To be a Chicana without shame means having the 
freedom to code-switch  and  to  write  bilingually:  “until  I  can  take  
pride   in  my   language,   I   cannot   take  pride   in  myself”   (81).   She  
adds:  “I  will  no  longer  be  made  to  feel  ashamed  of  existing.  I  will 
have  my  voice:  Indian,  Spanish,  white.  I  will  have  my  serpent’s  
tongue—my  woman’s  voice,  my  sexual  voice,  my  poet’s  voice.  I  
                                                     
14 In   “If  Black  English  Ain’t   a  Language,  Tell  Me  What   Is,”   James  Baldwin  
likewise  observed  that  “[language]  reveals  the  private  identity,  and  connects  one  
with, or divorces one from, the larger public, or communal  identity”  (Baldwin). 
15 Anzaldúa  writes:  “If a person, Chicana or Latina, has a low estimation of my 
native tongue, she also has a low estimation of  me”  (Borderlands 80). 
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will  overcome  the  tradition  of  silence”  (81).  Like  her  description  
of   shame,   Anzaldúa’s   description   of   pride   is   revelatory   of   the 
struggles of Chicanas in the US.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This essay is meant to have persuaded readers that in 
order to understand how shame works for Chicanas in the US, as 
well as how to convert it into pride, we need to read Anzaldúa in 
addition to Sartre, Fanon, and Ramos. Despite her resonances with 
Sartre,   Anzaldúa   is   much   closer   to   Fanon’s   description   of   the  
Black   man’s   shame   than   she   is   to   Sartre’s   Peeping   Tom.   Her  
experience of shame results not from something she has done, but 
who she is. Anzaldúa is a Mexican-American like Fanon is a 
Black   man.   If   Sartre’s   character   becomes   a   Peeping   Tom   by  
getting caught peeping, Fanon and Anzaldúa become Black and 
Brown just by being. Peeping Tom had a choice not to peep; 
Fanon and Anzaldúa did not have that choice. 
Anzaldúa’s  Existentialism  connects  at  least  three  better-
recognized branches: the European branch that includes 
Kierkegaard and Sartre, the Africana branch that includes Du 
Bois, Fanon and Baldwin, and the Mexican branch that includes 
Vasconcelos, Ramos and Paz. Many figures in this sub-discipline 
have  been  reluctant  to  accept  the  title  “Existentialist,”  and  perhaps  
Anzaldúa would have challenged this definition too. But reading 
her as part of these lineages shows how Chicana Existentialism 
constitutes a distinct variety of Existentialism that converses with 
its European, Mexican, and Africana counterparts. So far, 
Mexican and Africana Existentialisms have added variety, 
complexity, and correction to the European canon. In time, 
Chicana Existentialism will also be recognized as adding unique 
perspectives on questions concerning the suffering and liberation 
of Hispanic women. These readings of Anzaldúa as an 
Existentialist philosopher have constituted one step in the process 
of developing Chicana Existentialism. 
 The research I have begun here can be continued in at 
least three ways: 1) Historical: Anzaldúa scholars might track 
down the historical connections between Anzaldúa and the major 
figures in European, Mexican, and Africana Existentialisms. This 
would involve   scouring   Anzaldúa’s   archives   at   the   Nettie   Lee  
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Benson Library at UT Austin. 2) Philosophical: Anzaldúa scholars 
might develop the field of Chicana Existentialism. This would 
involve reading the work of Anzaldúa and other Chicana 
intellectuals to highlight and develop the Existentialist themes 
found therein. 3) Comparative: Anzaldúa scholars would benefit 
from a more extensive comparison of her ideas to those offered by 
the Africana Existentialist tradition, especially their analyses of 
lived experience as nonwhites living in the US. 
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